This issue of Business & Society contains the transcripts of 12 oral history interviews with founders of and early contributors to the business and society/social issues in management field. The publication of these interviews is the culmination of a very long-term project, with the first interview having been conducted in 1993 with Lee Preston and the most recent interview having been conducted in 2011 with Jim Post. This project has been very much of a team effort with Sandra Waddock, John (...) Steiner, Mary Mallott, Ariane Berthoin Antal, and, of course, our interviewees all playing important roles. (shrink)

Orthodox bioethics is distinctive in how it reflects on issues in bioethics. This distinctiveness is found in the relationship of spirituality and liturgy to ethics. Eber's essay, however, treats the distinctiveness as absolute uniqueness. In so focusing on the incommensurability of Orthodox bioethics Eber fails to tell his reader what Orthodox bioethics is about. Furthermore, his description of Western Christian ethics is seriously inaccurate.

PAPERS IN LOGIC AND ETHICS by A. N. Prior. Duckworth, 1976. 233 pp. £8.95.THE DOCTRINE OF PROPOSITIONS AND TERMS by A. N. Prior. Duckworth, 1976. 143 pp. £5.95.

Content: Sprache, Recht und Rechtsverbindlichkeit: R. Fukawa: An Analysis of the aeRules of Recognition Statement' u W. Krawietz: What does it mean to follow an aeInstitutionalised Legal Rule'? u N. MacCormick: Citizens' Legal Reasoning and its Importance for Jurisprudence u Y. Morigiwa: Hart's Theories of Language and Law u R.Tuomela: Supervenience, Collective Action, and Kelsen's Organ Theory uRecht und politische Kultur: G. Haney: Recht als Form von Kultur u A. Kojder: Dysfunctionalities of Legal Cultur u A. Lopatka: Law and Religion (...) in Poland u M. Samu: Culture and Law: Legal Culture uWerteordnung als ideologische Basis des Rechtsstaats: R. Dreier: Konstitutionalismus und Legalismus u O. Maenpaa: Unilaterality and Consensualism in the Application of Law u K.-F. Lenz: Zivilprozea und Spiel u M. Pavcnik: Ideologie der Rechtsanwendung versus argumentierte Rechtsentscheidung u J. Uusitalo: Legal Dogmatics, Epistemology, Radical Hermeneutics u Entwicklung der Rechtsordnung und soziale Gerechtigkeit: V. Luizzi: Legal Validity and Justice u H. Rottleuthner: Recht und Technik in entwicklungstheor. Perspektive u S. Panou: Uber die aeGerechtigkeit' des Rechts u A. Squella: Legal Positivism and Democracy in the 20. Century u D. Wyduckel: Konsens und gesellschaftlich-technischer Fortschritt u Soziale Mechanismen der Rechtsanwendung und Rechtsfindung: H. Aoi: Richterliche Rechtsfindung als Pattern-Matching-Prozea uu.a. (Franz Steiner 1991). (shrink)

The posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is the most likely site where egocentric spatial relationships are represented in the brain. PPC cells receive visual, auditory, somaesthetic, and vestibular sensory inputs; oculomotor, head, limb, and body motor signals; and strong motivational projections from the limbic system. Their discharge increases not only when an animal moves towards a sensory target, but also when it directs its attention to it. PPC lesions have the opposite effect: sensory inattention and neglect. The PPC does not seem (...) to contain a “map” of the location of objects in space but a distributed neural network for transforming one set of sensory vectors into other sensory reference frames or into various motor coordinate systems. Which set of transformation rules is used probably depends on attention, which selectively enhances the synapses needed for making a particular sensory comparison or aiming a particular movement. (shrink)

Is it possible to interfere with individual decision-making while preserving freedom of choice? The purpose of this article is to assess whether ‘libertarian paternalism’, a set of political and ethical principles derived from the observations of behavioural sciences, can form the basis of a viable framework for the ethical analysis of public health interventions. First, the article situates libertarian libertarianism within the broader context of the law and economics movement. The main tenets of the approach are then presented and particular (...) attention is given to its operationalization through the notion of a ‘nudge’. Essentially, a ‘nudge’ consists in an intervention, which aims to suggest one choice over another by gently steering individual choices in welfare-enhancing directions yet without imposing any significant limit on available choices. Finally, the article concludes that, while it fails as an overreaching framework of ethical analysis, libertarian paternalism nonetheless constitutes a valuable addition to the conceptual toolbox of public health ethics. (shrink)

This collection of essays, addresses, and one interview come from the years 1966-73 and cover a wide spectrum of interest, dealing with such general topics as 'The Absence of God in Modern Culture' and 'The Future of Christianity.'.

Nos três problemas preambulares e nas primeiras lições do Commentarium in De anima atribuído a Pedro Hispano, o autor: 1) discute a possibilidade de urna ciência da alma; 2) compara a ciência da alma com as outras ciências naturais; 3) identifica o método da ciência da alma. Daí emerge uma fundamentação da "ciência da alma" como "ciência do homem" e um modelo de organização das ciências, tendencialmente coincidente com a organização do corpus aristotélico, mas com a reivindicação da superioridade da (...) Ciência da alma por razões gnosiológicas. (shrink)

Roman Catholic moral theology follows a centuries-old tradition of moral reflection. Contemporary Roman Catholic moral theory applies these traditional arguments to the realm of medical ethics, including the issues of active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Unavoidable moral limits on licit medical intervention sometimes require that the moral duty to treat, cede to the duty to cease treatment when measures become more harmful than beneficial to the patient. This does not reduce the need for the compassionate use of palliative care in (...) response to suffering. However, it does mean that rather than being excessively committed to maintaining mere biological human life, or actively seeking death, that we learn a sober realism about the limits of human life. Catholic moral analysis examines an act objectively, both in its relation to the agent and as a material event in the world. This allows both the virtuous or vicious intentions of the agent and the effects of the action to be included in its moral evaluation. Thus, Catholic moral analysis is both quasi-deontological and quasi-consequentialist. Objectively, active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, as acts of deliberate killing, are seen as repugnant, in that they fail to incarnate a benign inner intention or to form an agent in virtue. Catholic moral theology is extremely skeptical that an act of intending death directly can be consonant with a sincere compassion for the dying, suffering person and views it as a direct negation of the precious gift of human life. (shrink)

Why is there a 'hard problem' of consciousness? Why do we seem unable to grasp intuitively that physical brain processes can be identical to experiences? Here I comment on the 'meta-problem' (Chalmers, 2018), based on previous ideas (Storm, 2014; 2018). In short: humans may be 'inborn dualists' ('neuroscepticism'), because evolution gave us two (types of) brain systems (or functional modes): one (Sp) for understanding relatively simple physical phenomena, and another (Sm) specialized for mental phenomena. Because Sp cannot deal with the (...) immense complexity of the brain processes underlying consciousness, it represents them as fundamentally different from nonmental physical phenomena (dualist intuition), using 'simulations' to produce 'Sm-type understanding'/predictions that seems radically different from 'Sp-type understanding'. (By analogy, different sensory modalities, handled by distinct brain systems, evoke qualitatively different experiences.) Brain systems for Sp representations of our brain processes never evolved, because they would be useless. When lacking a single 'template' matching different aspects of reality (objective vs. subjective = simulated), complementary 'models' are needed ('neuro-complementarity'), like the wave–particle duality in quantum mechanics. Thus, it seems plausible that Sp and Sm evolved because they were needed to cope with different challenges, and that 'problem intuitions' are side effects of these useful but different brain systems. (shrink)